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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
It would be convenient if it should be held that, since the
judgment is binding under the amended rule on the entire class,
the claims for or against the whole class are in controversy.
This would be an entirely realistic view, and one consonant with
the stated purpose of the amount in controversy requirement, to
avoid having the federal courts "fritter away their time in the
trial of petty controversies." A good deal of ancient learning
will have to be forgotten, however, if this practical and sensible
result is to be reached.34
Since their inception, federal courts have dealt with the problem
of when to aggregate the similar claims of several plaintiffs or de-
fendants, in order to satisfy statutory minimum jurisdictional amount
requirements. The traditional right of each person to have his day
in court seems to conflict with the practical necessity of solving a
mutual problem with the least amount of litigation. Through the
years the courts have set up various standards by which to judge
this issue, and each has subsequently been discarded as vague, con-
fusing and unworkable. New Rule 23, however, seems to provide a
liberal, more workable manner in which to consolidate cases for the
greater convenience of both courts and parties. Such a flexible rule
has been desperately needed for some time; yet now that it is here,
many courts seem unwilling to break with traditional concepts formed
under now defunct rules which were largely unworkable even in
the less complicated days in which they were formulated. One can
only hope that this view of the new rule as being substantially the same
as the old is only a temporary setback, not a trend, and that the
well-reasoned arguments of the text-writers will serve to finally, albeit
belatedly, end the torturous practice of case by case fact study to
determine when to aggregate.
Linda L. Hupp
Federal Courts-The Scope of Pendent Jurisdiction
A minor was injured in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania in
which all parties involved were residents of Pennsylvania. For pur-
poses of creating federal jurisdiction, a New Jersey guardian was
14 2 BARRON & HOLZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Wright
ed.), § 569 (Supp. 1966). The author adds that if the "ancient learning"
prevails, we shall be right back to the inherent difficulties of "joint" and"common" of "which it was a purpose of the amended rule to avoid."
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appointed for the minor to create diversity of citizenship. An
action to recover for the minor P's injuries was then instituted in the
appropriate federal court. The minor's mother, who lacked diversity,
joined in the suit in her own right, seeking out-of-pocket medical
expenses. D moved to dismiss the mother's claim. Held, motion
granted. The district court in granting D's motion stated that where
the court had jurisdiction of the minor's action solely by reason of
diversity of citizenship between the guardian appointed to prosecute
the minor's claim and the D, the minor's mother who lacked diversity
from the D could not, as a matter of right, join her claim for out-of-
pocket medical expenses. The court thus refused to allow the
application of pendent jurisdiction as a matter of right McSparron
v. Weist, 270 F.Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
The concept of pendent jurisdiction in our federal courts has
been subject to a constant evolution and liberalization since its incep-
tion.' The factual situation in this case confronted the court with
a difficult decision of whether judicial economy and expediency
dictated a further liberalization of pendent jurisdiction as opposed to
placing definite limitations on its applicability. In restricting its ap-
plicability, the decision offers an opportunity to explore generally the
merits of pendent jurisdiction, particularly as applied to federal
jurisdiction gained by diversity of citizenship.
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.2 This limited
jurisdiction as conceived by the Constitution has two branches: one
grounded on the nature of the parties; the other, on the character of
the issues. With respect to the first branch, the federal courts have
original jurisdiction of civil actions between citizens of different
states.' The underlying purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide
a safeguard within the federal judicial system against the prejudices of
local courts and local juries.4
There has been an abundance of criticism concerning the value
and need for federal diversity jurisdiction. Justice Frankfurter
recorded his criticism when he referred to "the mounting mischief
IThe doctrine of pendent jurisdiction gives a federal court the power
over any claim for relief not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction so long as
it derives from a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim that
is properly within the power of the court as outlined in the Constitution.
Newman v. Freeman, 262 F.Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
2 U. S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332-33 (1966).
3 Id.
4 Riley v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 173 F.Supp. 416 (S.D. IM. 1959).
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inflicted on the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance
of diversity jurisdiction."' It is argued that diversity cases cause
undue congestion in the federal courts.6 In addition, federal judges
under the rule of Erie R. R. v. Thompkins7 are required to apply state
law and thus must decide difficult questions on which only the
state courts can speak authoritatively.' In the face of the mounting
criticism, Congress has shown no inclination to abolish this jurisdic-
tion. Thus, the federal courts must attempt to resolve its problems.
In determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists, nominal parties
are disregarded." However, a general guardian who has a legal right
to sue and represent one who has an equitable interest is not regarded
as a nominal party, and the citizenship of the guardian determines
jurisdiction."° In Fallot v. Gouran," a New Jersey guardian brought
suit in a federal court on behalf of an incompetent Pennsylvania
citizen and the court held that "the means for determining the
existence of diversity jurisdiction in a situation such as this is not by
looking to the citizenship of the incompetent but to the citizenship of
the guardian, if he has capacity to sue."' 2 And in Johnstone v.
O'Connor,'3 the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a
dismissal of the action even though a guardian was appointed for the
sole purpose of obtaining the diversity of citizenship requisite to
bringing action in federal court."
The foregoing authorities indicate that a valid federal claim under
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was asserted in the guardian's
action in the present case. The propriety of the court taking juris-
diction in addition to the asserted non-federal claim of the minor
plaintiff's mother provided the troublesome issue.
Early in our judicial history, Osborn v. Bank of the United States'5
declared that once a valid federal claim was asserted and federal
jurisdiction was established, the federal court could decide all related
state questions that were necessary to the final disposition of the
5 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954).
6 C. WmGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (1963).
7 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 id.
9 Wood v. David, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 467 (1855); Carneal v. Banks, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825).
,o Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903).
1"220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955)
12 Id. at 327.
13 164 F.Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
14' d.
Is 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 204 (1824).
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case. 6 Although the roots of pendent jurisdiction can be traced to the
Osborn case and later decisions,17 the commonly recognized source
of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is Hum v. Oursler.'8 The
Hum doctrine, as it is often referred to, formulates a two-part
criterion for the proper application of the principle of pendent juris-
diction. A federal court has jurisdiction over purely local or state
issues when the case involves first, a substantial federal question,
and secondly, when the federal and non-federal claims are part of
a "single cause of action."' 9 It is generally conceded that the "single
cause of action" requirement is satisfied when the federal and non-
federal claims rest upon facts that are substantially the same.2
To further illustrate the application of pendent jurisdiction, it has
been held that where a federal court has jurisdiction of a cause of
action based on alternative theories of recovery, one arising under
federal law and one under state law, then it has jurisdiction to dispose
of the entire controversy even though the federal claim is decided
adversely to the party asserting jurisdiction.2 And in such a case,
the court ruled that the "single cause of action," requisite to applying
pendent jurisdiction is satisfied when substantially identical facts will
support both theories of recovery.22
At first glance, the facts of the principal case indicate that the
requirements for pendent jurisdiction were satisfied and the court was
wrong in dismissing the mother's pendent claim; that is, diversity of
citizenship constitutes a proper federal question and liability on both
claims rests on substantially the same facts. However, there is an
additional aspect of pendent jurisdiction which makes the concept
flexible and enables the courts to prevent abuse of its application.
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction involves a discretionary element
which merits careful consideration in every case. The Supreme Court
has recently held that pendent jurisdiction need not be exercised
in every case in which it is found to exist. 3 "[P]endent jurisdiction
is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right."2 4 Judge Magruder
16Id.
'7 Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
18 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
19 Id.; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).2 0 Armstrong Co. v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938); Kleinmon v.
Betty Dan Creations, Inc., 189 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951).
21 Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
22 Id.
23 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
2 4 Id. at 726; Moynahan v. Pari-Mutual Employees Guild, 317 F.2d 209
(9th Cir. 1963); Massachussetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth &
Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950).
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in his concurring opinion in Strachman v. Palmer,2" counseled that
"[fiederal courts should not be overeager to hold on to the determi-
nation of issues that might be more appropriately left to settlement in
state court litigation .... 26
In McSparron, the court expressed its awareness of the problems
that could result if the recent Newman v. Freeman27 precedent, a
factually similar case, but which granted pendent jurisdiction on
motion to join after suit had begun, were to be construed as allowing
pendent jurisdiction as a matter of right. It thus appears that
the McSparron court was cognizant of the need for this discretionary
power and properly refused the mother's pendent claim.
The expansion of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction has been
justified on the grounds of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants. The beneficial aspects of this doctrine make
possible a complete remedy for the adjudication of the plaintiff's
rights while avoiding piecemeal litigation. The essence of a successful
application of this doctrine is a balancing process which should
encompass discretion by the court in the weighing of the various
problems involved. The federal courts should remain cognizant
of the adverse effects of an infringement upon state court integrity.
Since there is no general Congressional authorization for pendent
jurisdiction, it appears that in each particular case, provided the
requirements of the Hum doctrine are satisfied, the federal courts




Ps, a mother of nine and her husband, employed Ds, three phy-
sicians, to perform a sterilization operation upon the wife. The
operation was suggested by Ds to prevent deterioration of the wife's
physical condition which would result from the birth of another child.
Subsequently the wife became pregnant. Prior to the birth of the
25 177 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1949).
26 Id. at 433. See also Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine
of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 CoLum. L. RExv. 1018
(1962); 46 ILL. L. Rrv. 646 (1951); Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expand-
ing Concept in Federal Court Jurisdiction, 51 IowA L. BEv. 151 (1965).
27 262 F.Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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